Borrower heterogeneity within a risky mortgage-lending market by Rabitsch, Katrin & Punzi, Maria Teresa
Department of Economics
Working Paper No. 241 
Borrower heterogeneity within a risky 
mortgage-lending market 
Maria Teresa Punzi 
Katrin Rabitsch 
February 2017
Borrower heterogeneity within a risky
mortgage-lending market ∗
Maria Teresa Punzi1 and Katrin Rabitsch1
1Vienna University of Economics and Business
October 18, 2016
Abstract
We propose a model of a risky mortgage-lending market in which we take
explicit account of heterogeneity in household borrowing conditions, by intro-
ducing two borrower types: one with a low loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, one with
a high LTV ratio, calibrated to U.S. data. We use such framework to study a
deleveraging shock, modeled as an increase in housing investment risk, that falls
more strongly on, and produces a larger contraction in credit for high-LTV type
borrowers, as in the data. We find that this deleveraging experience produces
significant aggregate effects on output and consumption, and that the contrac-
tionary effects are orders of magnitudes higher in a model version that takes
account of borrower heterogeneity, compared to a more standard model version
with a representative borrower.
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1 Introduction
Empirically, the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of household borrowers in
the U.S. economy, at the onset of the financial crisis, documents stark differences in
household leverage, and features, among it, a small fraction of highly indebted house-
holds. We present a macroeconomic model of the household mortgage market in which
we take account of this fact by extending an otherwise standard model with a low-LTV
type and a high-LTV type borrower group. We show that a deleveraging process, mod-
eled as a shock to the riskiness of housing investment of borrowers, that falls mostly
on the high LTV group of borrowers produces a sizeable macroeconomic contraction,
orders of magnitude larger than when the model features a representative borrowing
agent. We argue that adding features of heterogeneity into core macroeconomic mod-
eling frameworks may thus be of paramount importance, and may help to understand
why a small part of the economy can have large effects on the aggregate macroeconomy,
such as was the case for the subprime mortgage market at the beginning of the financial
crisis.
The key contributions of our paper are thus twofold. One, we document that a
contraction of household credit, brought about by an increase in household borrower
riskiness, produces negative effects on aggregate economic variables, such as GDP and
aggregate consumption. This is important against the background that most models in
the literature attribute little effect of household credit on aggregate macroeconomic vari-
ables. For example, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015) show that leveraging
(or deleveraging) cycles can have only a moderate impact on macroeconomic aggregates
because the responses of Borrowers and Savers cancel out in the aggregate, i.e. when
negative shocks hit the credit cycle, Borrowers work more and cut their consumption
in both goods and housing, while Savers behave in the opposite way. This phenomena
of ’washing out’ is typical in this class of models. See, for example, Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011). Two, the negative effects are
amplified when we take explicit account of borrower heterogeneity and when the con-
traction of overall credit falls on highly indebted households. This regards the effect on
aggregate GDP and consumption; but also the outstanding overall debt level and the
house price, which, in conventional models often displays little variation in this model
class. Empirically, house prices and the home mortgage loans to GDP ratio in the
US have experienced large swings over the leveraging and deleveraging cycle, for the
period of 1975-2012, as reported in Figure 1. While the increase in both variables was
moderate in the first part of the period, a huge run-up is evident since the 2000s until
the peak of the financial crisis.1 We argue that a model with explicit heterogeneity of
1A large portion of debt outstanding comprised of securitized mortgages and debt held by
Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). By the end of 2009, GSEs accounted for about 54%
of all mortgage originations, while commercial banks, federal and related agencies and life insurance
companies reached around 31%, 6% and 2%, respectively. After 2009, GSEs completely collapsed, and
federal agencies have been the major source of mortgage financing. See Figure 7 in Appendix.
2
borrowers’ LTV ratios, that produces quantitatively more pronounced swings, consti-
tutes a mechanism by which the leveraging (or deleveraging) cycle may contribute more
to the business and financial cycle.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
We develop our results in a state-of-the-art dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model, that comes in a baseline, and in an extended model version. Both
versions feature a household sector that consists of Savers and two types of Borrowers,
described in more detail below. In the baseline model, borrowing and lending directly
takes place between these agents. In the extended model a role for a financial interme-
diary, a banking sector, is included, which Savers use for their deposits and from which
Borrowers obtain loans. The rest of the model is standard; the production side features
a competitive final good sector, as well as an intermediate goods sector that is subject
to nominal rigidities; a monetary policy authority follows a Taylor rule.
The household sector requires a more detailed description. All household types con-
sume goods and housing services, the Saver (patient) lends to Borrowers (impatient).
Borrowers, who use their housing as collateral in a mortgage contract, come in two
types: a low-LTV type Borrower and high-LTV type; the different LTV ratios arise,
endogenously, from differences in the idiosyncratic housing investment risk of each bor-
rower group, following the literature on risky mortgages, e.g., Forlati and Lambertini
(2011).2,3 We calibrate the LTV ratios of the model from the empirical LTV distribu-
tion from the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac database, which covers around 12 million
in home purchases of single-family loans issued in the US, and we simulate a drop in
the LTV ratios occurred between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Figure 2 reports
LTV distributions for the period of 2000-2006 (solid line) and 2009 (dashed line). The
Figure reveals deep heterogeneity in the distribution, and a small portion of households
that holds mortgages with an LTV ratio almost equal to 100% of the value of the house.
Moreover, the distribution has changed since the financial crisis, accounting for lower
LTV ratios. We calibrate the model to the period of 2000-2006. The low-LTV type
borrower is calibrated to the lower 74-th percentile of the sample distribution, contain-
ing all LTV ratios lower than 80%, which has an average LTV ratio equal to 67%. The
high-LTV type borrower is calibrated to the upper 26-th percentile of the sample, con-
taining all LTV ratios between 80% and 100%, which displays a mean LTV ratio equal
to 91%. We contrast this ’heterogeneous borrowers’ model to an more conventional
2Quint and Rabanal (2014), Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2015) and Ferrante (2015) employ
similar setups.
3To be precise, the low-LTV and the high-LTV type Borrower are not single (representative) agents,
but are borrower groups, that each consists of many members. The members of a borrowing group
face idiosyncratic housing investment risk, that is key for the modeling of the risky mortgage contract.
However, since there is perfect risk sharing among all members of a borrower group, and they thus
have the same consumption and housing demand decisions, we use the terms ’low(high)-LTV type
borrower’ and ’low(high)-LTV type borrower group’ interchangeably.
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case of a representative borrowing agent4, in which case the two borrower groups’ LTV
ratios are identical and calibrated to the overall mean of the LTV distribution, equal
to 73%. The latter is called the ’homogenous borrowers’ version.
[Fig. 2 about here.]
We then use the model to conduct the following experiment. We study the delever-
aging effects of an unanticipated increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic housing in-
vestment risk that mimics the drop in LTV ratios observed at the onset of the crisis.
The LTV distribution on loan-level data collected from the Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac database, shows that after the financial crisis, outstanding loans have been issued
at a lower LTV ratio, and the deepest drop occurred in 2009.5 See Figure 2 (dashed
line). In the ’homogeneous borrowers’ version, this produces a drop of the (economy-
wide) LTV ratio from 73% to 69%, and is similar in spirit to the exercise in Forlati and
Lambertini (2011). In our ’heterogeneous borrowers’ version, instead, the fall in the
economy-wide average LTV ratio is the same, but the re-evaluation of the riskiness, and
thus the bulk of the contraction in credit, falls more strongly on high-LTV borrowers,
whose LTV drops from 91% to 85%, as in the data. On the other hand, the LTV of low
type borrowers drops only from 67% to 64%. A re-evaluation of the riskiness of high-
LTV type households leads to a wave of defaults when house prices drop and this group
find themselves underwater, i.e. the mortgage repayment is higher than the current
value of the house which has been used to pledge against borrowing. Despite featuring
the same drop in the economy-wide average LTV ratio, the ’heterogeneous borrowers’
version of the model shows a substantially amplified drop in aggregate consumption and
output, leading to a deep recession. It also produces more pronounced swings in asset
prices and sharp reactions in the total debt level. In the extended model, the presence
of a banking sector and a role for financial intermediation contributes to additional
amplification in both ’homogenous borrowers’ and ’heterogeneous borrowers’ economy.
This paper is related to different strands of the literature. First, the paper adds to
the literature on macro-financial linkages where financial frictions are incorporated in
the New Keynesian DSGE models. A large body of literature, in most instances building
on the seminal contributions of Kiyotaki, Moore, et al. (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), has studied the amplification mechanism of shocks through credit
market imperfections, on real variables, credit variables and asset prices. In order to
consider such amplification mechanism, most of the literature has introduced a represen-
tative Saver and representative Borrower in a standard DSGE model. (See Iacoviello
(2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Mendicino and Punzi (2014), Campbell and Her-
cowitz (2009), Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010), Iacoviello (2015), Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015) for
4Again, there is not strictly speaking a ’representative borrowing agent’. Instead ’the borrower’ is
composed of many members i that face idiosyncratic housing investment risk, but there is perfect risk
sharing among all i members.
5Similarly, Bokhari, Torous, and Wheaton (2013) provide evidence that before the financial crisis
about 25% of Borrowers held mortgage loans with a 80%< LTV ≤ 100%
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a non-exhaustive list of the literature on household borrowing and housing). In con-
trast to this literature, we depart from the representative borrower assumption. To our
knowledge, only Punzi and Rabitsch (2015) have so far introduced borrower heterogene-
ity. Namely, in that paper, we introduce heterogeneity in investors’ ability to borrow
from collateral in a Kiyotaki-Moore style macro model, calibrated to the quintiles of
the leverage-ratio distribution of US non-financial firms. There, we find that financial
amplification intensifies, because of stronger asset price reactions among highly levered
investors. This paper is closely related, but with a focus on the mortgage and housing
market. Moreover, the mechanism is fundamentally different. In Punzi and Rabitsch
(2015), an additional amplification on output arises from the fact that loans affect the
productive capacity of the borrowing agents; this is not typically the case for household
debt, and, in fact, there is little to no effect on aggregate real variables in response to
sources of shocks other than the deleveraging/ riskiness shock.6
Second, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on wealth heterogeneity
by developing a dynamic model with the aim to replicate household default and pro-
longed recessions. At the empirical level, Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) documents the
importance of heterogeneity in wealth, debt and liquidity assets across U.S. households,
showing that leveraged households do not have the same marginal propensity to con-
sume. Similarly, Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) show that households with little
or no liquid wealth have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of their income.
Therefore, heterogeneity matters and it should be taken into account in macroeconomic
models.
Third, the paper contributes to the growing literature on risk shocks and endogenous
LTV ratios. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) allow for time-varying volatility of
cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty in a model with a financial accelerator mech-
anism a` la Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (BGG). They find that risk shocks are crucial
in understanding the drivers of business cycle fluctuations. As regards mortgage de-
faults, this paper is closely related to Forlati and Lambertini (2011), Quint and Rabanal
(2014), Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2015) and Ferrante (2015). These papers all
share the principal idea that idiosyncratic housing risk shocks generate an endogenous
default decision which lead to underwater mortgages and house price collapse, trigger-
ing a credit crunch and deep recession.7 We contribute to this strand of the literature
6In particular, in response to technology, housing preference or monetary policy shocks, the results
are similar to Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015), in that the responses of Borrowers and
Savers (nearly) net out in aggregate. This regards at least the effects on aggregate output and con-
sumption. The responses of debt levels become significantly amplified in the ’heterogeneous borrower’
version as well, even in response to these standard shocks. This may be a notable result as well,
especially for (macroprudential) regulators interested in keeping debt levels contained. Nevertheless,
we see the key result of the present paper of heterogeneity in LTV ratios as lying in the additional
amplification on real aggregate consumption and output, as we obtain in response to the deleveraging
of mortgage risk shocks.
7Alternative mechanisms can be found in Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013), who introduce
news shocks to generate an excess credit boom, and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) who
introduce heterogeneous expectations to generate boom and bust in the housing market.
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by allowing for Borrowers’ heterogeneity and assuming that the credit contraction and
default on outstanding mortgage loans falls primarily on high-LTV type Borrowers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the baseline
theoretical model. Section three presents the extended model with a banking sector.
Section four discusses the calibration of parameters. Section five discusses in detail the
model experiment of a deleveraging experience, initiated through an unanticipated in-
crease of housing investment riskiness and presents results of the corresponding impulse
responses. We also show results in response to other, more standard shocks. Section
six concludes.
2 Baseline Model
The baseline economy features (i) a household sector, consisting of a Saver and two
types of Borrowers groups, (ii) a production sector that consists of a competitive final
good sector and an intermediate goods sector that faces monopolistic competition and
nominal rigidities, and (iii) a monetary policy authority.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by two types of households that work, consume and buy
real estate, and decide on their asset position: patient (denoted by s) and impatient
(denoted by bH and bL for the high-LTV and the low-LTV type, respectively). Patient
households have a higher propensity to save, therefore they have higher discount factor,
i.e. βs > βb. Thus, in equilibrium patient agents save while impatient agents borrow.
Housing is treated as a durable good with its demand depending on both the service
flow and asset value of housing units. The model allows for constrained agents who
collateralize the value of their homes.
Households supply labor, nj,t, and derive utility from consuming goods, cj,t, and
housing services, hj,t+1, as following:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(βj)
t
[
c1−σcj,t
1− σc + ε
h
t κ
h1−σHj,t+1
1− σH −
vnj
η
(nj,t)
η
]
, (2.1)
where j = {s, bH, bL} denotes the different types of households. As common in the
literature, housing services are assumed to be proportional to the stock of houses held
by the household. κ is the weight of housing preference in the utility function and εht is a
shock to the preference for housing services, vnj is a weighting parameter on the disutility
from labor. Households have total mass equal to one, out of which patient households
represent a fraction αs, impatient households a fraction αb, where αs + αb = 1. We
further denote with αbH and αbL the fraction (out of total borrowers) of high-LTV and
a low-LTV type borrowers, respectively, where, again αbH + αbL = 1.
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2.1.1 Patient households (Savers)
Patient households are indexed by s, and present mass αs of households. They accumu-
late properties for housing purposes, hs,t+1 and asset holdings, ds,t+1. They also receive
(real) dividends from firms, ∆s,t. Thus, they maximize their expected utility subject to
the following budget constraint,
cs,t + qh,t(hs,t+1 − (1− δh)hs,t) + ds,t+1 = ws,tns,t + Rt−1pit ds,t +∆s,t, (2.2)
where qh,t is the real price of housing, ws,t are real wages. Real variables are expressed in
units of the final good price.8 Rt−1 is the nominal gross interest rate on assets holdings
(deposits) between t− 1 and t. The stock of houses depreciates at rate δh.
Savers maximize 2.1 subject to 2.2 with respect to cs,t, ns,t, hs,t+1, and ds,t+1. The
first order conditions are, respectively:
λBCs,t = (cs,t)
−σc , (2.3)
vns (ns,t)
η−1 = ws,tλBCs,t , (2.4)
qh,t (cs,t)
−σc = βsEt
{
(cs,t+1)
−σc [qh,t+1] (1− δh)
}
+ εht κh
−σH
s,t+1, (2.5)
(cs,t)
−σc = βsEt
{
(cs,t+1)
−σc Rt
pit+1
}
. (2.6)
2.1.2 Impatient households (Borrowers)
Impatient households are indexed by bj and come in j = H,L types, a high-LTV
and a low-LTV borrower group; each type presents a mass (1 − αs)αbj of households.
Borrower type j accumulates properties for housing purposes, Hbj,t, and receives from
lenders (Savers in the baseline model) a one-period defaultable loan, Lbj,t, collateralized
by the value of the house they purchase. The mortgage contract follows closely Forlati
and Lambertini (2011), who introduce idiosyncratic risk and the possibility of default
– in a setup similar to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) – to housing investment.
Borrower group j’s budget constraint, expressed in nominal terms, is given by:
Ptcbj,t +Qh,t(hbj,t+1 − (1− δh)hbj,t) + [1− Fbj,t(ω¯bj,t)]RZj,tLbj,t
= Wbj,tnbj,t + Lbj,t+1 −Qh,t(1− δh)Gbj,t(ω¯bj,t)hbj,t), (2.7)
where Pt is the final (consumption) good price, Qh,t the nominal house priceWbj,tnbj,t
is the nominal labor income of borrower group j, and Lbj,t+1 are (nominal) loans taken
out from the lender (Saver) at t to be repaid in period t+1. RZj,t is the gross contractual
8We denote nominal variables with upper case letters, and real variables with lower case letters,
deflated by the final consumption good price. E.g. Qh,t (qh,t), Ws,t (ws,t), Ds,t (ds,t), Hs,t (hs,t), are
the nominal (real) house price, wage rate, asset holdings or housing stock, respectively.
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state-contingent loan rate paid to the lender by non-defaulting borrowers of borrower
group j. It is determined at time t after the realization of shocks and in order to satisfy
the participation constraint of lenders, explained below. Not all borrowers repay the
contracted loans; fraction Gbj,t(ω¯bj,t) of borrower group j’s housing stock is seized by the
lender in case of default. [1− Fbj,t(ω¯bj,t)] indicates the fraction of loans that the lender
is repaid. As in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Forlati and Lambertini
(2011), the seized housing stock is destroyed during the foreclosure process.
Each borrower group j consists of many members, indexed by i. Borrower group
j decides on its total housing investment, hbj,t+1, and the state-contingent mortgage
rates to be paid next period on the contracts signed this period. Borrower group j
assigns equal resources to each of its i members to purchase the housing stock hibj,t+1,
where
∫
i
hibj,t+1di = hbj,t+1. All i members of borrower group j are identical ex ante.
After finalizing the mortgage contract, the i-th member, having in hand housing stock
hibj,t+1, experiences an idiosyncratic shock ω
i
bj,t+1 such that her ex post housing value is
ωibj,t+1Qh,t+1h
i
bj,t+1. This captures the idea that housing investment is risky. The random
variable ωibj,t+1is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic shock which is log-normally distributed with
cumulative distribution Fbj,t(ω
i
bj,t+1). We allow for idiosyncratic risk but no aggregate
risk in the housing market, therefore Et(ω
i
bj,t+1) = 1. This implies that log(ω
i
bj,t) ∼
N(−σ
2
ωbj,t
2
, σ2ωbj ,t), where σωbj ,t is a time-varying standard deviation for each type of
borrower group, which follows an AR(1) process.
After realization of the idiosyncratic shock, member i of borrower group j decides
whether to repay the mortgage or to default. Define the threshold value ω¯bj,t as the
value of the idiosyncratic shock for which repayment of the loan at rate RZj,t is incentive
compatible with the member-i-borrower
ω¯bj,t+1(1− δh)Qh,t+1hbj,t+1 = Lbj,t+1RZj,t+1. (2.8)
Loans with high realizations of the idiosyncratic random variable, ωibj,t+1 ∈ [ω¯bj,t+1,∞],
are repaid, while loans with low realizations, ωibj,t+1 ∈ [0, ω¯bj,t+1], are defaulted on. In
case of default, the defaulting members loose their housing stock9, which goes to lenders.
However, lenders need to costly verify the default state by paying a monitoring cost to
assess and seize the collateral connected to the defaulted loan, which is assumed to be
a fraction µbj of the housing value, µbjω¯bj,t+1Qh,t+1hbj,t+1.
We follow Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Forlati and Lambertini (2011),
Quint and Rabanal (2014) and Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2015) in defining a
one-period mortgage contract which guarantees lenders, assumed to be risk neutral, a
predetermined rate of return on their total loans to borrower group j. At time t, the
lender makes total loans Lbj,t+1 to borrower group j, and demands the gross rate of
return Rt. Therefore the expected return from granted mortgages should guarantee
9We follow Forlati and Lambertini (2011) in assuming that, despite the i-th borrower’s loss of her
housing stocks in case of default, there is perfect consumption insurance among all members of each
borrower group, so that consumption and housing investment of each group are ex post equal across
members of the group.
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lenders a certain funding rate equal at least to rate, Rt. This leads to the following
participation constraint:
RtLbj,t+1 =
{
(1− µ) ∫ ω¯bj,t+1
0
ωibj,t+1(1− δh)Qh,t+1hbj,t+1ft+1(ωibj)dωibj
}
+
{∫∞
ω¯bj,t+1
RZj,t+1ft+1(ω
i
bj)dω
i
bj
}
,
(2.9)
where f(ωibj) is the probability density function of ω
i
bj. Equation 2.9 states that
the return on total loans the lender expects to obtain comes from two components:
one, the housing stock, net of monitoring costs and depreciation, of the defaulting bor-
rowers, i.e. of all i members with low realizations of the idiosyncratic shock (equal to
the first term on the right hand side); and, two, the repayment by the non-defaulting
borrowers, i.e. from all i members with high realizations of the idiosyncratic shock
(equal to the second term on the right hand side). Once the idiosyncratic and ag-
gregate shocks hit the economy, the threshold values ω¯bj,t+1 and the state-contingent
mortgage rate RZj,t are determined, to fulfill the above participation constraint. Denote
with Gt+1(ω¯bj,t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯bj,t+1
0
ωibj,t+1ft+1(ω
i
bj)dω
i
bj the expected value of the idiosyncratic
shock for the case ωibj,t+1 ∈ [0, ω¯bj,t+1] multiplied by the probability of default, while
Γt+1(ω¯bj,t+1) ≡ ω¯bj,t+1
∫∞
ω¯bj,t+1
ft+1(ω
i
bj)ω
i
bj+Gt+1(ω¯bj,t+1) is the expected share of housing
values, gross of monitoring costs that goes to lenders in case of default. Substituting
in from equation 2.8 into 2.9, and using the just defined expressions, the participation
constraint can be written, in real terms, as following:
Rtlbj,t+1 =
[
Γt+1(ω¯bj,t+1)− µbjGt+1(ω¯bj,t+1)
]
(1− δh)qh,t+1hbj,t+1pit+1, (2.10)
where lbj,t+1 is the real debt position of borrower group j, i.e. lbj,t+1 = Lbj,t+1/Pt,
qh,t+1 = Qh,t+1/Pt+1 is the real house price and pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt is consumer price
inflation. Under 2.10, borrower group j is subject to a constraint that limits its leverage
by a fraction of the expected future value of its current housing wealth at time. We
can also define the debt ratio
lbj,t+1
qh,t+1hbj,t+1
, which defines each group Borrowers’ leverage
position, and the (endogenous) loan-to-value ratio of borrower group j as:
Γt+1(ω¯bj,t+1)− µbjGt+1(ω¯bj,t+1).
The part of the housing stock that all members of borrower group j are left with,
after accounting for defaulting members, is∫ ∞
ω¯bj,t+1
(1− δh)qh,t+1hbj,t+1ft+1(ωibj)dωibj = [1−G(ω¯bj,t+1)] (1− δh)qh,t+1hbj,t+1.
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We can now combine the above expression with equations 2.7, 2.8 and 2.10 and
rewrite the Borrowers’ budget constraint, in real terms, as follows:
cbj,t + qh,t(hbj,t+1 − (1− δh)hbj,t) + Rt−1pit lbj,t
= wbj,tnbj,t + lbj,t+1 + [1− µbjGbj,t(ω¯bj,t)] (1− δh)qh,thbj,t. (2.11)
The optimization problem of borrower group j is then given by maximizing equation
2.1 subject to equations 2.11 and 2.10. Denoting with λBCbj,t the Lagrange multiplier on
the constraint 2.11, and with λPCbj,t the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint 2.10, the
first order conditions with respect to cbj,t, nbj,t, hbj,t+1, lbj,t+1, and ω¯bj,t+1 are:
λBCbj,t = (cbj,t)
−σc , (2.12)
vnbj (nbj,t)
η−1 = wbj,tλBCbj,t , (2.13)
qh,t (cbj,t)
−σc = βbEt
{
(cbj,t+1)
−σc [qh,t+1] (1− δh) [1− µbjGbj,t+1(ω¯bj,t+1)]
}
+ εht κh
−σH
bj,t+1,(2.14)
(cbj,t)
−σc = βbEt
{
(cbj,t+1)
−σc Rt
pit+1
+ λPCbj,tRt
}
, (2.15)
0 =
λPCbj,t+1[Γ
′
t+1(ω¯bj,t+1)− µbjG′t+1(ω¯bj,t+1)](1− δh)Etqh,t+1hbj,tpit+1
−βbjEt (cbj,t+1)−σc µbjG′t+1(ω¯bj,t+1)(1− δh)Etqh,t+1hbj,t.
(2.16)
2.2 Production
The production side of the economy consists of a competitive final good sector, and
an intermediate goods sector. The latter operates under monopolistic competition and
sticky prices.
2.2.1 Final goods producers
The final good, yt, is produced by perfectly competitive firms using yt(i) units of each
type of intermediate good i and a constant elasticity of substitution technology:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ξ−1
ξ di
] ξ
ξ−1
, (2.17)
From standard profit maximization, input demand for the intermediate good i is
obtained as:
yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ξ
yt, (2.18)
where Pt is the CES-based final (consumption) price index given by
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ξdi
] 1
1−ξ
. (2.19)
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2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Output of producer i, denoted yt (i), is produced using the following technology:
yt (i) = ε
z
tns,t (i)
γs [nbH,t (i)
γH nbL,t (i)
γL ]
1−γs , (2.20)
where ns (i) and nbj (i) is labor demanded by firm i from patient and each of the
two impatient agents, respectively.10 γs is the share of labor of Savers in the production
function, and (1− γs) the share of labor from the two borrower groups, further split up
into each group j = H,L, where γH+γL = 1. ε
z
t is an aggregate productivity shock. As
in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we assume that different labor types
are unit-elastic. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed
by i, with total mass one. At time t, each intermediate firm is able to revise its price
with a probability (1− θ) as in Calvo (1983). Intermediate firms are owned by patient
households. Producer i takes as given demand for her good i, equation 2.18, and the
production function, equation 2.20, and chooses optimal inputs ns,t, nbj,t, for j = H,L
and for all periods k, and the price of good i, Pt (i), such as to maximize her lifetime
expected discounted profits:
maxEt
∞∑
k=t
(βsθ)
k−t UCst+k
UCst

Pt (i) yt+k (i)−Ws,t+kns,t+k (i)−
H,L∑
bj=1
Wbj,t+knbj,t+k (i)
+MCt+k (i)
[
εzt+kns,t+k (i)
γs [nbH,t+k (i)
γH nbL,t+k (i)
γL ]
1−γs − yt+k (i)
]

The first order conditions that result from this problem can be summarized, already
expressed in real terms, as:
ws,t = γsmct (i)
yt (i)
nst (i)
, (2.21)
wbj,t = (1− γs) γbjmct (i) yt (i)
nbj (i)
, for j = H,L, (2.22)
p˜t (i) =
ξ
ξ − 1
Et
∞∑
k=t
(βsθ)k−t
UCst+1
UCst
piξt+kyt+kmct+k
Et
∞∑
k=t
(βsθ)k−t
UCst+1
UCst
piξ−1t+k yt+k
, (2.23)
where p˜t (i) ≡ Pt(i)Pt is the optimal relative price of firm i, and wst = WstPt and
wbjt =
Wbjt
Pt
are real wages. The last equation uses the fact that the real marginal cost
mct = MCt/Pt, is equal for all producers i, since it is a function of (aggregate) wage
rates only, i.e. mct (i) = mct =
1
εzt
wγsst [wbH,t(i)γHwbL,t(i)γL ]
1−γs
[γs]
γs [γH(1−γs)]γH (1−γs)[γL(1−γs)]γL(1−γs)
. From equation
10For similar specification, see Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014), Mendicino and Punzi
(2014) and Brzoza-Brzezina, Gelain, and Kolasa (2014).
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2.19, one can derive the link of the optimal price p˜t (i) to aggregate price behavior under
the Calvo setting as
1 = (1− θ) (p˜t (i))1−ξ + θpiξ−1t . (2.24)
We also define firm i’s period t (real) profits:
∆t (i) = yt (i)− ws,tns,t (i)−
H,L∑
bj=1
wbj,tnbj,t (i) (2.25)
2.3 Housing Producers
Housing producers combine a fraction of the final goods purchased from retailers as
investment goods, ih,t, to combine it with the existing housing stock in order to produce
new units of installed houses. Housing production is subject to an adjustment cost
specified as
ψh
2
(
ih,t
ht−1
− δh
)2
ht−1, where ψh governs the slope of the housing producers
adjustment cost function. Housing producers choose the level of ih,t that maximizes
their profits
max
ih,t
qh,tih,t −
(
ih,t +
ψh
2
(
ih,t
ht−1
− δh
)2
ht−1
)
.
From profit maximization, it is possible to derive the supply of housing
qh,t =
[
1 + ψh
(
ih,t
ht−1
− δh
)]
, (2.26)
where qht is the relative price of capital. In the absence of investment adjustment costs,
qht , is constant and equal to one. The usual housing accumulation equation defines
aggregate housing investment:
ih,t = ht − (1− δh)ht−1. (2.27)
2.4 Monetary Policy
The Central Bank follows a standard Taylor-type rule which responds to changes in
inflation and output:
Rt
R¯
= (Rt−1)
φR
(pit
p¯i
)φpi(1−φR)(yt
y
)φY (1−φR)
εrt (2.28)
where φpi is the coefficient on inflation in the feedback rule, φY is the coefficient on
output, and φR determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. ε
r
t is an i.i.d. monetary
policy shock.
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2.5 Market Clearing
Define aggregate consumption and the aggregate housing stock as
ct = αscs,t + αb
H,L∑
bj=1
αbjcbj,t,
ht = αshs,t + αb
H,L∑
bj=1
αbjhbj,t.
To close the model, we need to specify the aggregate market clearing conditions. Market
clearing in the assets market implies:
αsds,t = αb [αbH lbH + αbLlbL] . (2.29)
Labor market clearing requires:∫ 1
0
ns,t(i)di = αsns,t,
∫ 1
0
nbj,t(i)di = αbαbjnbj,t, for j = H,L. (2.30)
Good market clearing, obtained by combining aggregate versions of equations 2.2,
2.11, 2.29, 2.30 and 2.25, reads11:
yt = ct + qh,tih,t. (2.31)
2.6 Exogenous Factors
Shocks to productivity, εzt , house preference, ε
h
t and monetary policy, ε
r
t , follow an
autoregressive process of order one:
ln υt = ρυ ln υt−1 + ευ,t,
where υ = {z, h, r} , ρυ is the persistence parameter and ευ,t is a i.i.d. white noise
process with mean zero and variance σ2υ.
Similar to Forlati and Lambertini (2011), the idiosyncratic housing investment
shocks, ωbj,t , for j = H,L, follow a log-normal distribution, i.e. log(ωbj,t) ∼ N(−
σ2ωbj,t
2
, σ2ωbj ,t).
The standard deviations, σ2ωbj ,t, are time-varying and follow an AR(1) process, such that:
ln
σωbj ,t
σωbj
= ρω ln
σωbj ,t−1
σωbj
+ εbjω,t, , for j = H,L,
where εbjω,t is an i.i.d. shock.
11Strictly speaking, the market clearing condition, reads ytst = ct+qh,tih,t, where variables st denotes
price dispersion among Calvo price setters. However, since we consider a first order approximation of
the model to solve for the model dynamics, we can safely ignore this term.
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3 Extended Model
In the extended model a role for a financial intermediary, a banking sector, is included,
which Savers use for their deposits and from which Borrowers obtain loans. The finan-
cial intermediary is part of the household sector, and has mass αfi; the total household
mass remains equal to one, so that now αs + αb + αfi = 1.
3.1 Banking Sector
The banking sector follows a similar setup as in Kollmann, Enders, and Mu¨ller (2011)
and Kollmann (2013). We assume there is a bank which, at time t, receives deposits
from the Savers, denoted dfi,t, and make loans to each type of Borrowers, l
bj
fi,t, for
bj = H,L, where subscript fi stands for holdings of these types of assets by the financial
intermediary. The financial intermediary faces a bank capital constraint which requires
the capital (
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t−dfi,t) not be smaller than a fraction φ of the bank’s assets
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t.
The banking sector maximizes
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtfi ln(cfi,t),
subject to the flow of funds
cfi,t+
Rdt−1
pit
dfi,t+
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t+1 +Γc
(
dfi,t+1,
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t+1
)
+Γx (xt) = dfi,t+1 +
Rlt−1
pit
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t
and capital constraint
dfi,t+1 ≤ (1− φ)
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t+1,
where cfi,t denotes the financial intermediary’s consumption (dividends) and βfi is
its discount factor; Γc > 0 denotes real marginal operating cost of collecting deposits
and extending loans, assumed to be linear, i.e. Γc(dfi,t+1,
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t+1) = Γsdfi,t+1 +
H,L∑
bj=1
Γbjl
bj
fi,t+1. We follow Kollmann, Enders, and Mu¨ller (2011) in assuming that the
bank can hold less capital than the required level, but that this is costly (e.g., because
the bank then has to engage in creative accounting). Such cost is a convex function of
the excess capital of the bank, xt, and follow the properties that Γx(xt) > 0 for xt < 0,
Γ
′′
x ≥ 0, and Γx(0) = 0. Therefore the bank pays a positive cost if xt < 0. Excess bank
capital is given by
xt = (1− φ)
H,L∑
bj=1
lbjfi,t+1 − dfi,t+1
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The first order conditions with respect to cfi,t, dfi,t+1, and l
bj
fi,t+1,, for j = H,L, are:
λBCfi,t =
1
cfi,t
, (3.1)
1
cfi,t
[1− Γs + Γ′x] = βfiEt(
1
cfi,t+1
Rdt
pit+1
), (3.2)
1
cfi,t
[1 + ΓB + Γ
′
x] = βbEt(
Rlt
cfi,t+1pit+1
). (3.3)
3.2 Market Clearing
Asset market clearing now implies:
αfidfi,t = αsds,t,
αfi
[
lbHfi,t + l
bL
fi,t
]
= αb [αbH lbH + αbLlbL] .
The definition of aggregate consumption becomes:
ct = αscs,t + αb
H,L∑
bj=1
αbjcbj,t + αficfi,t.
4 Parameterization
The model is parameterized at a quarterly frequency, aimed at capturing key features for
the US over the period 1975-2006.12 Table 1 reports these ratios under the homogenous
scenario, i.e. all Borrowers are treated equally, and under the heterogenous scenario,
i.e. we specify a high-LTV type and low-LTV type Borrower group. The parameter
values are summarized in Table 2.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
The discount factor of the Savers, βs, is set equal to 0.99 to match the annualized
steady state interest rate of 4%, while the Borrowers’ discount factor, βb, is assumed
to be lower than the Saver’s discount factor and equal to 0.98.13 The inverse of the
12Data source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Federal Reserve System, the Mortgage
Bankers Association - National Delinquency Survey, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Appendix 1.
13Similarly, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti
(2015) choose 0.998 for the lenders discount factor and 0.99 for the borrowers discount factor in order
to distinguish the relative impatience of the two groups. Iacoviello (2015) has a similar value for the
Savers, but sets a much lower discount factor for the Borrowers, equal to 0.94.
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Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, is set equal to 2 and the labor disutility parameter,
vnj , is equal to 1, implying log preferences. The coefficients on relative risk aversion for
consumption goods, σc, and housing services, σH , are both set to 1. Housing stocks
depreciate at a rate of 0.0089 and the weight of housing in utility function, κ, is set to
0.075. We follow Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2014) and Justiniano, Prim-
iceri, and Tambalotti (2015) in taking into account evidence on the ratios from the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) when setting the parameters between patient and
impatient households in the production function. According to the SCF in 1992, 1995,
1998, 2001 and 2007, the average share of borrowers is about 60%; therefore the share
of Savers’ labor income in the goods sector, γs, is set at 0.64, with a complimentary
share of (1− γs) for borrowers, whereof each borrower group’s share, γH and γL, in Bor-
rowers’ Cobb-Douglas labor supply are set to 0.5.14 Those values also help to match
the ratio of hours worked between Borrowers and Savers of about 1.1. We set ξ equal
to 11, which implies a steady-state markup of 10% in the goods sector.
The housing investment adjustment cost parameter, ψh, is set to equal 14 as in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010).15 For the monetary policy rule we chose a coefficient for
the interest rate inertia, ρR, equal to 0.8, a moderate reaction to the output gap, ρY =
0.125, and a reaction to inflation of ρpi = 1.5. The Calvo probability of changing price
is set to 0.75, implying that prices are fixed for a year on average, a fairly standard
value in the literature. Similar to Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the technology shock and
housing demand shock follow an autoregressive process of order one, with persistence of
0.95 and 0.96, respectively. The standard deviation is set to 0.01 for technology shock
and 0.04 for housing demand shock. Monetary policy shocks are i.i.d. with a variance
equal to 0.23%.
Turning to the parameters related to the mortgage contract – monitoring cost, µj,
the autoregressive coefficient and standard deviation of the idiosyncratic housing risk
shock, ρωbj and σωbj –, we focus our attention on targeting the values from a detailed
empirical LTV ratio distribution. This approach thus differs from Forlati and Lamber-
tini (2011), who aim to match the US delinquency rate, and who obtain an average
LTV ratio which is lower than standard values find in the literature (see Iacoviello
(2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Iacoviello (2015), Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tam-
balotti (2014), Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015), Kiyotaki, Moore, et al.
(1997), Brzoza-Brzezina, Gelain, and Kolasa (2014) and Mendicino and Punzi (2014)).
Instead we calibrate the LTV ratios for the economy-wide average (for the ’homogenous
14Iacoviello (2005) use a value of 0.36 and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate a value of 0.21.
Justiniano et al. (2014) calibrate the average share of borrowers equal to 0.61 to match the relative
labor income of 0.64 in the SCF. Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) call hand-to-mouth (HtM)
households such Borrowers who spend all of their available income every period, and estimate the
fraction of them equal to 0.31 using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) during the
period 1989-2010.
15The housing investment adjustment cost parameter is responsible mostly in determining how fast
the housing stock is (allowed to) rebound after a shock to housing investment risk that destroyed part
of the housing stock. All the other variables are largely unaffected by alternative calibration of the
housing adjustment cost.
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borrowers’ version) and for the two different groups of Borrowers (for the ’heterogeneous
borrowers’ version). In particular, we choose values to match the mean values of the
loan-to-value ratios distribution from the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac database, cover-
ing around 12 million in home purchases of single-family loans issued during the period
of 2000-2006. Figure 2 (solid line) reports the cumulative distribution of LTV ratios,
which reveals clear heterogeneity: loans that fall into category 0 < LTV ≤ 80%, that
is, all holdings of mortgage loans issued with a LTV ratio less or equal to 80%, con-
stitute 74 percent of total loans; this lower 74-th percentile of the sample distribution
has an average LTV ratio equal to 67%. The upper 26-th percentile of the sample, con-
taining all holdings of mortgage loans issued with a LTV ratio between 80% and 100%
(80% < LTV ≤ 100%), displays a mean LTV ratio equal to 91%.16 In contrast, the
homogenous borrower model with a representative borrowing agent shows an overall
mean of the LTV distribution of 73%. See Table 3, Panel (a).
To obtain the economy-wide LTV ratio of 73% in the homogenous model version, the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic housing risk shock is set equal to σω=0.1125, to-
gether with monitoring cost µ=0.12. To match the LTV ratios under the heterogeneous
scenario (i.e. low-LTV type =67% and high-LTV type =91%), we choose σωL=0.147
and σωH=0.028, the monitoring cost for both groups, µj, remains at 0.12. Each Bor-
rower’s size, αbj, is set to the share of mortgage applications under a specific LTV ratio,
αbL = 0.74 and αbL = 0.26.
Figure 2 (dashed line) documents the changes in the distribution of LTV ratios in
2009: the economy-wide average LTV ratio drops from 73% to 69%, while the mean of
the LTV ratio belonging to the lower 76-th percentile of the sample distribution drops
from 67% to 64%, and the mean LTV ratio of the upper 24-th percentile of the sample
drops from 91% to 85%. See Table 3, Panel (c). To capture this deleveraging experience
in our model, in which (the change in) LTV ratios endogenously arise(s) from the
(change in) importance of housing investment risk, we proceed as follows: we ask what
the levels of σωL and σωH (or σω) would be which would be needed to replicate the lower
LTV ratios in 2009, of 64% and 85% (73%) for the low-LTV and the high-LTV type (for
the representative Borrower in the homogenous borrower scenario) respectively, if this
deleveraging experience were permanent. In order to replicate these stylized facts in our
model, the standard deviation of idiosyncratic housing investment risk needs to increase
by 20% in the homogenous borrower model, i.e. σω increases from 0.1125 to 0.1350;
in the heterogeneous borrower scenario, the riskiness of the high-LTV type Borrowers,
σωH , is required to increase by 91%, from σωH=0.028 to σωH=0.053, to generate the
drop from an LTV ratio of 91% to 85%, while simultaneously an increase in the riskiness
of the low-LTV type Borrowers, σωL, of 13%, from σωL=0.147 to σωL=0.166, generates
the drop from an LTV ratio of 67% to 64%. We set the persistence of the shocks
to housing investment risk very high and equal to 0.99, capturing the idea that the
16Similarly, Bokhari, Torous, and Wheaton (2013) analyze single-family home mortgages originated
in the US over the period 1986 to 2010 and find that about 76% of the loans contain an average LTV
ratio up to 80%, 13% contain an average LTV ratio between 80% and 90%, while 11% contain an
average LTV ratio between 90% and 100%.
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deleveraging shock at the onset of the crisis is perceived an an (almost) permanent re-
evaluation of the riskiness of investment risk in the mortgage market.17 Table 3, Panel
(b)-(c), shows that, over the average period of 2008-2010, the main drop in the LTV
distribution occurred in 2009.
[Table 3 about here.]
In the extended model version, we also need to specify the parameters attributed to
the financial intermediary, the bank. We calibrate the required bank capital ratio equal
to 0.08.18 This value reflects the rules defined under Basel III, which requires that the
total risk-weighted capital requirements, which is defined as total (Tier 1 and Tier 2)
capital divided by total risk-weighted assets, be at least 8%. The discount factor is set
equal to the Savers’ discount factor. The bank operating cost coefficient is set equal to
0.0018, while the cost on banks’ excess capital is set to 0.1264, similar to Kollmann,
Enders, and Mu¨ller (2011).
5 Simulation Results: Impulse Responses
5.1 Baseline Model: Idiosyncratic Housing Investment Risk Shocks
Figure 3 plots the dynamic responses to a deleveraging experience, resulting from an
unanticipated increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic housing investment risk, σωbj,t.
The Figure compares two scenarios: the ’homogeneous borrowers’ scenario (solid line),
where all borrowers face the same LTV ratio, and where the economy-wide average LTV
ratio drops from 73% to 69%; and the ’heterogeneous borrowers’ scenario (dashed line),
where there exists two types of Borrowers, low-LTV type Borrower (0 < LTV ≤ 80%)
versus high-LTV type Borrower (80% < LTV ≤ 100%), who experience a drop in their
respective groups’ LTV ratios from 67% to 64% and 91% to 85%, as described in section
4.
The responses in the ’homogenous borrower’ and the ’heterogeneous borrower’ sce-
narios are qualitatively similar. The increase in the standard deviations of idiosyncratic
housing investment risk increases default rates, monitoring costs and the external fi-
nance premium. As a result of the mortgage risk shock, Borrowers’ financial conditions
worsen, more members of each borrower group default on their loans and loose their
housing stock in the process, while non-defaulting members pay a higher mortgage
17In particular, we do not believe that this is necessarily the ’correct’ persistence if we were to
parameterize the model for typical variations in investment riskiness (or LTV ratios) in ’normal times’,
over the business cycle. Instead, when capturing the idea that, particularly the riskiness of the small
market segment of subprime mortgages was evaluated too optimistically, the adjustments in evaluating
riskiness of this market were of more permanent nature. There is no comparable value in the literature;
Forlati and Lambertini (2011) choose a lower persistence, equal to 0.9 in a similar exercise. While
this leads to a somewhat smaller drop in LTV ratios in our experiment, it leaves our results largely
unchanged.
18Kollmann, Enders, and Mu¨ller (2011) show that the capital ratios of US commercial banks have
been in the range of 7-8%.
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interest rate. The tightening of credit conditions that occurs with the drop in loan-
to-value ratios reduces the ability to borrow from the housing stock, forcing borrowing
agents to reduce their consumption, housing stock, and increase hours worked. At the
same time, Savers increase their consumption and cut hours worked, and reduce their
lending in response to falling interest rates.
The heterogeneous model version in which the bulk of the credit crunch and the
adjustments in LTV ratios falls on the high-LTV type Borrower group displays a sub-
stantially amplified drop in real and financial variables, relative to the homogenous
model version, despite being subject to the same drop in the economy-wide average
LTV ratio. In particular, the heterogeneous borrower model version leads output and
aggregate consumption to decrease three times as much as in the homogenous model
version (panels ’Output’ and ’Total Consumption’). This highlights the differences in
household net worth and wealth effects across types of Borrowers. The disruption of the
highly leveraged Borrowers’ balance sheet decreases their ability to take new mortgage
loans to finance their spending, and, because of a higher marginal propensity for both
consumption and housing goods, results in a more severe drop in housing demand and
consumption. The fall in housing demand experienced by all Borrowers in the het-
erogeneous borrowers version (panel ’House Demand Borrowers’) is twice the drop in
the homogenous borrower version, and driven by the strong cutback in high-LTV type
borrowing (panel ’Borrowing Type H’). The strong tightening of collateral constraint
on high-LTV type Borrowers also leads them to cut back severely also on consumption
goods and demand for new mortgage loans, therefore total lending decreases an addi-
tional 8% over and above the drop of 12% in the homogeneous scenario (panel ’Total
Lending’). The heterogeneous model version leads to a fall in the rate of return on
outstanding loans approximately twice as large as that found in the homogeneous sce-
nario, leading Savers to reduce their lending more. Moreover, while output and total
consumption display a rapid drop and rebound, total lending falls substantially and
persistently. Savers, in order to smooth consumption and avoid a drop in their utility,
increase the demand of goods and housing services. The increase in Savers’ housing
demand, and the presence of housing adjustment costs, leads to an increase in housing
investment after the initial drop. Both model versions display similar impact behav-
ior of residential investment and house prices, but the heterogeneous borrower version
produces more pronounced swings, shedding light on the importance of borrower het-
erogeneity in magnifying asset prices fluctuations.
To sum up, the collapse in the endogenous LTV ratios and particularly strong
deleveraging process for the high-LTV type Borrower, generates a stronger amplification
of the financial accelerator mechanism, despite the same reduction in loan-to-value
ratios on average. The increased riskiness of high-LTV type households leads to a wave
of defaults when the quality of this type’s borrowers’ housing stock drops and they find
themselves underwater, i.e. the mortgage repayment is higher than the current value of
the house which has been used to pledge against borrowing. The reallocation in terms
of consumption, housing and borrowing of the high leverage group is so strong as to
drag down the entire economy. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) emphasize, in empirical
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work, the role of heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to consume in affecting the
aggregate consumption through the distribution of wealth losses.19 The results of our
theoretical model are in line with these findings. In fact, higher leverage increases the
marginal propensity to consume for higher indebted households relative to less indebted
ones and the real impact at a given aggregate loss in wealth is amplified.20
[Fig. 3 about here.]
5.2 Extended Model: Idiosyncratic Housing Investment Risk Shocks
This section discusses the transmission of housing investment risk shocks and the re-
sulting deleveraging episode in the extended model version, that includes a role of the
banking system. The financial intermediary, the bank, collects deposits from saving
households and makes loans to (both types of) borrowing household groups. In this
setting the bank has to finance a fraction of loans using its own equity. Figure 4 docu-
ments that the presence of the banking sector further amplifies the model dynamics in
response to idiosyncratic housing risk shocks. We continue to report impulse responses
for the homogeneous borrowers model version (solid line) and the heterogeneous bor-
rowers model version (dotted line).
As in the baseline model, the mortgage risk shock leads to worsening Borrowers’
financial conditions, and to more members of each borrower group defaulting on their
loans. Therefore, banks suffer losses because of foregone mortgage payments, higher
internal costs and mortgage defaults. These loan losses translate into a decrease in
banks’ assets; the bank thus deleverages, in order to avoid facing negative excess bank
capital and additional costs to engage in creative accounting, which leads to a further
contraction of credit from the real economy. The higher risk premium charged by banks
discourages new demand from loans, depressing house prices even more.
Thus, the deleveraging process of banks amplifies and propagates default shocks to
the real economy. Because of the more pronounced loan losses in the heterogeneous
model version, the heterogeneous borrower model with a banking sector produces a
larger amplification to the real economy: we observe a drop in total consumption and
output of around 3.5% deviations from steady state, relative to a drop of only 2% in
the homogenous borrower model. It should be noted that this mechanism, i.e. the
presence of the banking sector, leads to a further amplification in these two variables
in both the homogenous and the heterogeneous borrower version. The presence of
banks leads house prices to decrease more relative to the baseline model. This occurs
because, given a lower interest rate income, Savers increase their demand for houses by
19King (1994) emphasizes that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is much higher
for credit-constrained households.
20Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) provide evidence that households with a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
90% show to have a marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth three times as large as that
found in households facing a LTV ratio equal to 30%.
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less, relative to the baseline model. Therefore, the aggregate housing stock decreases
more, contributing also to a more pronounced house price drop, relative to a model
that abstracts from a banking system. Residential investments follow a similar pattern.
Total lending decreases as well, and the heterogeneous model version also generates
an extra amplification. However, the drop is less pronounced relative to a model that
abstracts from the banking sector. This occurs because, on impact, low-LTV type
Borrowers endogenously experience easier credit standards, allowing them to increase
their mortgage demand, at a given lower house price. Despite the fact that the fraction
of this group is 74% of the full sample, total lending still decreases but with smaller
magnitude compared to the baseline model. The model shows a switching of funding
allocation in the banking strategy. Since the collateral value shrinks in a declining asset
market, banks will be less willing to lend out to high-LTV type because those borrowers
may not be able to repay their debts through asset sales. Consequently, banks increase
the supply of loans to the low-LTV type. Even if, some Borrowers have access to better
credit standards, the negative wealth effect and larger financial accelerator mechanism
put in place by the high-LTV type Borrowers, generate a more pronounced drop in
their consumption, dragging down the aggregate consumption level. The interaction
between the bank’s ’financial acceleration’ and the wealth of high-LTV type Borrowers
thus generate a much deeper recession.
[Fig. 4 about here.]
5.3 Extended Model: Other Shocks
In this section we analyze the effects of TFP, housing demand and monetary policy
shocks. Figures 5 and 6 plot impulse responses to a 1% productivity increase (first
row), to a 1% increase in housing preference (second row) and to a 1% increase in the
policy rate. The case of the ’homogeneous scenario’ is depicted with a solid line, the
’heterogeneous scenario’ with a dotted line. We report only basic variables for these
shocks.
An increase in productivity leads to an increase in output and total consumption.
The increased TFP leads to a housing boom, which generates an increase in house prices
due to Borrowers’ increased housing demand. Demand for credit increases as well, at
aggregate and group levels. Borrowers with a high LTV ratio show a pronounced
wealth effect and a substantial increase in demand for credit. In comparison to the
homogenous setting, the model version with heterogeneous borrowers generates a higher
response on total lending. Total consumption also shows moderate amplification. The
remaining real variables are invariant to the use of a homogeneous scenario versus
a heterogenous one. The response of asset prices is also similar, as the additional
increase in the demand of goods and housing from Borrowers with higher LTV ratio in
the heterogeneous borrower case nets out the less pronounced increase from Borrowers
with a lower LTV ratio.
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The second row of Figures 5 and 6 plots impulse responses to an increase in housing
preferences, or similarly an increase in the demand for housing, which generates a
prolonged increase in house prices. This shock increases Borrowers’ collateral capacity,
allowing them to borrow and consume more. Because of a higher marginal propensity
to consume, Borrowers increase their consumption of goods and housing, which, despite
Savers reducing them, strengthens the increase in total consumption. The impact on
total consumption is quantitatively small, however the heterogeneous case generates
an additional amplification effect to some degree; on impact, consumption rises 0.37%
instead of only 0.21% in the homogeneous case. The response to total lending is, again,
more strongly amplified, rising 0.93% in the case of heterogeneous borrowers compared
to only 0.79% in the homogeneous case.
Third row of Figures 5 and 6 plot impulse responses to an contractionary monetary
policy. Consumption, output and asset prices all decrease. Again, the heterogeneous
case generates greater amplification in total lending, leading to an decrease of 0.9%
over 0.7% in the homogenous case, while the output and total consumption responses
are virtually identical.
[Fig. 5 about here.]
[Fig. 6 about here.]
In summary, comparing the heterogeneous model version with the homogenous
model version, standard shocks (productivity, housing preference, monetary shocks)
generate an additional amplification in the level of household indebtedness, coming
from the heterogeneity in wealth and marginal propensities to consume of low-LTV and
high-LTV type borrowers, yet there is only modest to no influence on other macroe-
conomic variables, such as output or aggregate consumption. We conclude that it is
thus primarily risk shocks, as documented in previous sections, for which a model with
heterogeneous borrowers is able to generate a more pronounced amplification in real
and financial variables in the transmission mechanism.
6 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the importance of borrower heterogeneity for the quantitative
consequences of real and financial variables in response to a deleveraging episode, that
results from an increase in housing investment risk in a risky mortgage market. We
contrast two model versions: a model version with explicit consideration of a low-LTV
type and a high-LTV type borrower group, that accounts for the empirical stylized
fact that households’ loan-to-value ratios vary significantly over its distribution; and, a
model version where a representative borrower faces a loan-to-value ratio equal to the
mean value of the loans distribution.
The contractionary effects of a credit disruption that falls more heavily on high-
LTV type borrowers, as in the data, are orders of magnitude more severe compared to
22
a standard model with a representative borrowing agent, despite the same economy-
wide drop in LTV across the two settings. Output and aggregate consumption drop
three times as much, and an additional amplification is obtained also for the responses
of total household debt level, housing investment and asset prices.
In an extended model version we add a banking sector, which offers an additional
channel of amplification, because banks are themselves leveraged agents. Since the
collateral value shrinks in a declining asset market, banks will be less willing to lend
out to high-LTV type Borrowers because of their inability to repay debts through asset
sales. The interaction between banks’ financial friction and the wealth effects of high-
LTV type Borrowers generates an even deeper recession.
Other than the housing investment risk shock, we consider also more standard
sources of shocks (productivity, housing preferences, monetary policy) and find that
the model version with heterogeneous borrowers leads mostly to an additional amplifi-
cation in total lending, and less so for other aggregate variables.
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Borrower heterogeneity within a risky mortgage-lending market
Technical Appendix
A Data and Sources
Aggregate Consumption. Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally ad-
justed, billions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Pop-
ulation (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
Gross Domestic Product. Real Gross Domestic Product (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by CNP16OV. Source: BEA.
Residential Investment. Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally ad-
justed, billions of chained 2005 dollars), divided by CNP16OV. Source: BEA.
Inflation. Quarter on quarter log differences in the implicit price deflator for the
nonfarm business sector, demeaned. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Nominal Short-term Interest Rate. 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market
Rate), expressed in quarterly units. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Real House Prices. Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold
including value of lot) deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business
sector. Source: Census Bureau.
Hours in Consumption Sector. Total Nonfarm Payrolls (Source: Saint Louis Fed
Fred2) less all employees in the construction sector (Source: Saint Louis Fed Fred2),
times Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers, divided by CNP160V. Source:
BLS.
Real Wage in Consumption-good Sector. Average Hourly Earnings of Production/
Nonsupervisory Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls, Total Private, divided by the
price index for Personal Consumption Expenditure (source: BEA). Source: BLS.
Households and nonprofit organizations home mortgages liability (seasonally ad-
justed, millions of current dollars), divided by the implicit price deflator and divided
by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population. Source: The Federal Reserve Board.
Seriously delinquent mortgages, not seasonally adjusted, percentage of total mort-
gages. Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey.
Loan-to-value ratios: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac database, covering around 12
million in home purchases of single-family loans issued during the period of 2000-2006.
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[Fig. 7 about here.]
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Table 1: Steady-state Ratios
Variable Homogeneous Heterogeneous
scenario scenario
Annual short-term interest rate 4.04 4.04
Consumption, Savers 67.96 68.08
Consumption, Borrowers 32.04 31.92
Consumption, Borrower low-type 16.02 16.07
Consumption, Borrower high-type 16.02 15.84
Housing Demand, Savers 71.03 70.41
Housing Demand, Borrowers 28.97 29.59
Housing Demand, Borrower low-type 14.48 13.97
Housing Demand, Borrower high-type 14.48 15.62
Hours worked, Savers 74.71 74.69
Hours worked, Borrowers 89.01 89.15
Hours worked, Borrower low-type 44.50 65.72
Hours worked, Borrower high-type 44.50 23.42
Loans 0.56 0.61
Loans low-type 0.56 0.32
Loans high-type 0.56 1.41
Loan-to-Value Ratio , avg 73.00 73.40
Loan-to-Value Ratio low-type 73.00 67.09
Loan-to-Value Ratio high-type 73.00 91.38
Default Rate on Mortgages low-type (annual) 1.24 1.67
Default Rate on Mortgages high-type(annual) 1.24 0.27
External Finance Premium low-type (annual) 0.19 0.28
External Finance Premium high-type(annual) 0.19 0.04
Mortgage Interest Rate low-type (annual) 4.30 4.38
Mortgage Interest Rate high-type (annual) 4.30 4.14
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Table 2: Parameters’ Values
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
scenario scenario
βs Discount factor Savers 0.99 0.99
βb Discount factor Borrowers 0.98 0.98
αs Fraction of Savers 0.50 0.50
αb Fraction of Borrowers 0.50 0.50
σc Relative risk aversion on consumption 1 1
σH Relative risk aversion on housing services 1 1
γs Saver labor share in production 0.64 0.64
γL, γH Borrower j type share Borrowers’ labor 0.5 0.5
νnj Labor disutility parameter 1 1
η Labor supply aversion 2 2
κ Housing preference parameter 0.075 0.075
Xss Marg. cost of production 11 11
ψk Adj cost housing 14 14
δh Housing depreciation parameter 0.0089 0.0089
θ Calvo parameter 0.75 0.75
φpi Taylor-rule parameter, inflation 1.5 1.5
φr Taylor-rule parameter, int. rate smoothing 0.8 0.8
φy Taylor-rule parameter, output 0.125 0.125
ρz AR(1) coefficient on TFP shocks 0.95 0.95
ρh AR(1) coefficient on housing demand shocks 0.96 0.96
ρr AR(1) coefficient on monetary policy shocks 0 0
σz Standard deviation on TFP shocks 0.01 0.01
σh Standard deviation on housing demand shocks 0.04 0.04
σr Standard deviation on monetary policy shocks 0.0023 0.0023
µL, µH Monitoring Cost 0.12 0.12
ρω,L AR(1) coefficient on riskiness shock 0.99 0.99
ρω,H AR(1) coefficient on riskiness shock 0.99 0.99
σω,L Standard deviation on riskiness shock 0.1125 0.147
σω,H Standard deviation on riskiness shock 0.1125 0.028
σω,L Standard deviation on variance of riskiness shock 0.2 0.1278
σω,H Standard deviation on variance of riskiness shock 0.2 0.91
nbL Size of low-LTV Group 0.5 0.26
nbH Size of high-LTV Group 0.5 0.74
βfi Discount factor banks 0.99 0.99
φ Bank capital ratio 0.08 0.08
Γc Banks’ operating costs 0.0018 0.0018
Γc Banks’ excess capital 0.1264 0.1264
αfi Fraction of banks 0.05 0.05
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Table 3: Share of Borrowers from LTV Distribution
Panel (a)
Period: 2000-2006
LTV Distribution LTV Value Share of Borrowers
Homogeneous
Scenario 0 < LTV <= 100 0.73 100%
Heterogeneous 0 < LTV <= 80 0.67 74%
Scenario 80 < LTV <= 100 0.91 26%
Panel (b)
Period: 2008-2010
LTV Distribution LTV Value Share of Borrowers
Homogeneous
Scenario 0 < LTV <= 100 0.71 100%
Heterogeneous 0.66 74%
Scenario 0.87 26%
Panel (c)
Period: 2009
LTV Distribution LTV Value Share of Borrowers
Homogeneous
Scenario 0 < LTV <= 100 0.69 100%
Heterogeneous 0.64 74%
Scenario 0.85 26%
Data Sources: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac database (holdings of 12 million in home
purchases of single-family loans).
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Fig. 1: Real house price (left side) and mortgage-to-real estate ratio (right side) for
the U.S
Data Sources: Home mortgages of U.S. households and nonprofit organizations (Flow
of Funds). Real new one-family houses sold including value of lot deflated with the
implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector (Census Bureau).
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Fig. 2: Loan-to-Value Distribution
Data Sources: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac database (holdings of 12 million in home
purchases of single-family loans).
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Fig. 3: Idiosyncratic Housing Investment Risk Shock in the Baseline Model: ‘ho-
mogeneous borrowers’ version (solid black line) versus ‘heterogeneous borrowers’
version (dotted blue line). All impulse responses are expressed in % deviations
from steady states, except the LTV ratios which are expressed in levels.
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Fig. 4: Idiosyncratic Housing Investment Risk Shock in the Extended Model: ‘ho-
mogeneous borrowers’ version (solid black line) versus ‘heterogeneous borrowers’
version (dotted blue line). All impulse responses are expressed in % deviations
from steady states, except the LTV ratios which are expressed in levels.
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Fig. 7: Funding for Mortgages. In percent, by source. Data 1970q1-2014q1.
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